Discussion Paper

Multiform Youth Extremism in Pakistan

PILdAT
Pakistan Institute of
Legislative Development
And Transparency

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Foreword

Extremism has become one of the most crucial challenges faced by Pakistan. It does not just target one but all segments of the society. However, there have not been very meaningful efforts to understand the entire spectrum of extremism in Pakistan, which is the first step towards forming a basis for a practical and cogent policy for thwarting extremism.

The paper **Multiform Youth Extremism in Pakistan** has been commissioned by PILDAT as an attempt to fill this void. The paper defines extremism and identifies conceptual as well as structural differentiation in its wider character and manifestations. A particular focus of this endeavour is to explore insight into whether or not extremism is inherently rooted in the religion or the proponents of extremism only use religion. The paper can also be used as an input by policy planners, decision-makers, analysts and development agencies. Analytical in nature, the paper helps provide adequate space for exploring fresh and innovative solutions to the challenges faced by Pakistan.

This peer-reviewed paper has been authored by **Mr. Muhammad Feyyaz,** an expert on counter-extremism peacekeeping, terrorism and security issues.

Disclaimer
The views, opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of PILDAT.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Mr. Muhammad Feyyaz holds an M. Phil. degree in Peace and Conflict Studies from the National Defence University, Islamabad. He has taught military art and science in academic institutions of armed forces of Pakistan as well as public policy and statecraft at National School of Public Policy, Lahore. Drawing upon his experience of peace keeping in Somalia in 1993, besides writing on various dimensions of peacekeeping operations, he has also collaborated with Sweden based International Challenges Forum in producing a key document *"Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations"* commissioned in 2010 for senior field commanders. Currently, he teaches at School of Governance and Society, University of Management and Technology in Lahore Pakistan. Mr. Feyyaz trains, consults and specializes in terrorism studies, intrastate armed conflicts, conflict analysis and strategization for conflict transformation.

Backdrop

Horrific terrorist attack in July 2011 in Oslo led many to assume that this was the work of Islamic terrorists, only to be surprised later as the undertaking of right-wing extremism, bred by an international anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant movement.[1] Similar secular strands of extremism were reflected by violent attacks against Roman people in the Czech Republic, anti-Semitic hate speech against intellectuals in Hungary, the serial killing of immigrants by the terrorist group National Sozialistischer Untergrund (National Socialist Underground) in Germany or killing of 26 people by Adam Lanza including 20 school children from western Connecticut USA in December 2012.[2] Oklahoma City bombing of 1995 was not different in content and images either. Identically violent landscapes of Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Congo, Sudan, Georgia, Kashmir, Northeast India and Sri Lanka coupled with recurring armed racial rioting in UK, all manifest a wide variety of extremism spanning socio-political, ethnic, ideological, religious and cultural spheres of societies worldwide.

However, much unlike elsewhere occurring in rather episodic fashion or waxing and waning in times, violent extremism in Pakistan has become organic feature of internal security environment of Pakistan mostly involving youth of the country. Some have therefore labelled the country as 'A full-blown Paranoid State Driven Less by Sensible Strategy than by Defiance',[3] while for others, it is the most dangerous place in the world.[4] It is also rated as one of the most hated countries in the world succeeded only by Iran and Israel.[5]

Ironically, Pakistanis are the only people who acknowledge their own influence on world as negative.[6] Ranked at 149 among 158 countries in Global Peace Index for the year 2012, Pakistan stands out particularly in political terror, violent demonstrations, intensity of deaths from internal conflicts, and ease of access to small arms and light weapons.[7]

More often than not, religious extremism alone is generally ascribed to turbulent environment of Pakistan. It indeed accounts for significant proportion of instability, yet in reality it is only a fractional component of the holistic setting which is beset by several forms of violence prone undercurrents and trends.

Efforts have been scanty, if any, to meaningfully cohere and examine wholesome spectrum of extremism in Pakistan in a single thesis. This paper is an attempt to fill this void. It does so by defining extremism and identifying conceptual as well as structural differentiation in its wider character and manifestations. A particular focus of this endeavour is to explore insight into whether or not extremism is inherently rooted in the religion or the proponents of extremism only use religion. Furthermore, it will be germane also to conceptualise genesis of extremism coupled with its effects and outcomes, and broadly how should the youth of Pakistan deal with extremism in addressing, containing and eradicating it.

The paper can also be used as an input by policy planners, decision-makers, analysts and development agencies. Analytical in nature, the paper helps provide adequate space for exploring fresh and innovative solutions to the challenges faced by Pakistan.

1. 'Extremism comes in many forms', Editorial- Norway Massacre, Globe Editorial, 25 July 2011, http://articles.boston.com/2011-07-25/bostonglobe/29813544_1_terrorist-attack-islamic-extremism, accessed 14 May 2012.
2. Felix Knappertsbusch, Björn Milbradt and Udo Kelle, 'Guest Editorial: Qualitative Research on Prejudice', *IJCV*: Vol. 7 (1) 2013, 50 – 56.
3. For example see DAN Blumenthal, 'Pakistan's Paranoia', *Harvard International Review*, vol. XXXI, No. 4 Winter 2010, http://www.spearheadresearch.org/page...ents/Harvard_International_Review.pdf; Sadanand Dhume, 'Why Pakistan Produces Jihadists' *The Wall Street Journal*, 3 May 2010,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703866704575223832888768098.html and Fouad Ajami, 'Islam's Nowhere Men' *The Wall Street Journal* 10 May 2010 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703338004575230142684329162.html, all accessed on 10 Jun 2010
4. Bruce Riedel, *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad,* New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2011, 112-114.
5. For full report see Global Scan, 'country' rating by influence' at http://www.globescan.com/84-press-releases-2012/186-views-of-europe-slide-sharply-in-global-poll-while-views-of-china-improve.html.
6. Ferya Ilyas, 'Iran, Pakistan, Israel most negatively rated countries: BBC poll', *The Express Tribune*, 17 May 2012.
7. See GPI Map 2012, http://www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi-data/#/2011/scor/PK/detail and http://www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi-data/#/2012/INCO/.

Perceptions, Misperceptions, History and Defining Extremism

The literature on development economics, policy reviews, organised violence, and peace and conflict studies abounds with definitions of extremism. A common feature of entire range of academic traditions, publications, public discourses and understanding on the subject is the view of extremists as *diseased, immoderate, inflexible or irrational actors, at times mixing social conservatism as well as sentimental attribute of society with religious narratives*.

Summarily these observations are best reflected in definition of extremism by Tomas Precht who defines it as *immoderate uncompromising views and measures beyond the norm*.[8] This construction underpinned by religious undertones largely associated with Muslims resonates almost uniformly in textual delineation of extremism by contemporary political, policy and academic circles. Public perceptions everywhere of extremists are similarly no different.

In effect, as will be analysed later in this paper, whether it is Pakistan, India or USA, the extremist elements are present in every society.[9] Throughout history, violent extremists—individuals who support or commit ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals—have promoted messages of divisiveness and justified the killing of innocents.[10] Misguided groups including international and domestic terrorist organizations, racists, secular, neo-Nazis, anti-faith and anti-Semitic hate groups have perpetually engaged in horrific violence to kill citizens and threaten our way of life,[11] highlighting historical and global nature of extremism.

A recent study based on extensive interaction with former militants and their socialization processes further indicates that extremism is less about religious or ideological but instead a youth issue.[12]

The US emphatically highlights that "Strong religious beliefs should never be confused with violent extremism."[13] It is a universal and versatile phenomenon, adapted with and shaped by contexts that generate it. For example, in socio-political milieu, extremism refers to political ideologies that oppose a society's core values and principles. The extremist beliefs are dependent on perspective since the person who holds views which are considered to be "extreme" within one cultural context or time may not be considered to hold "extremist" beliefs within another cultural context or time. In this sense, "Norms and values are intricately bound up in the definition of "extremism".[14]

In liberal democracies, extremism is applied to any ideology that advocates racial or religious supremacy and/or opposes the core principles of democracy and human rights.[15] Xenophobia in several African, Asian and Western nations as well as multiform racist extremism in Florida is a case in point.[16]

Within Islam notion of extremism is ascribed to the thought of the 'chosen ones' and the 'perfect people', which is construed as "a diseased thought that lends bias, prejudice and a sense of narcissism and these feelings always lead to intolerance and gender violence."[17] Latent radicalism among Muslims which is also conflated with

8.   Tomas Precht, 'Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Europe : From conversion to terrorism' , the Danish Ministry of Justice December 2007, http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/fileadmin/downloads/Forskning_og_dokumentation/Home_grown_terrorism_and_Islamist_radicalisation_in_Europe_-_an_assessment_of_influencing_factors__2_.pdf, accessed 17 April 2012.
9.   Ali Sukhanver, 'Extremism exploited', *Pakistan Observer*, 13 March 2013.
10.   Empowering local Partners to prevent violent extremism in the United States, National Strategy on Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism, White House August 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf.
11.   Ibid.
12.   'Jared Cohen Keynotes - Value of misperception', Trend Hunder Keynotes, http://www.trendhunter.com/keynote/intellectually-adventurous-keynote.
13.   Empowering local Partners to prevent violent extremism in the United States.
14.   D. Elaine Pressman, 'Risk Assessment Decisions for Violent Political Extremism 2009-02', October 2009, Canadian Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies, Paterson School of International Affairs, 1404 Dunton Tower, Carleton University.
15.   Peter Neumann, 'Prisons and Terrorism Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries', International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), 2010, http://icsr.info/publications/papers/1277699166PrisonsandTerrorismRadicalisationandDeradicalisationin15Countries.pdf, accessed 12 April 2012.
16.   'Extremism in Florida: The Dark Side of the Sunshine State', *Anti-Defamation League, New York*, 3rd Edition, 2011 www.adl.org/learn, accessed 15 May 2012.
17.   Xari Jalil, 'Giving context to religious extremism', Pakistan *Today* 20 Jun 2011.

extremism, is explained as a "tendency to be exclusive instead of inclusive vis-à-vis other communities on the basis of religious belief."[18] At times, extremism is mixed with radicalism which indicates the extent of its being misunderstood as a distinct approach or attitude.[19] Further, the term extremism is also used to describe methods through which political actors attempt to realize their aims, that is, by using means that 'show disregard for the life, liberty, and human rights of others' i.e., by resorting to violence. Many governments therefore refer to terrorists as' violent extremists'.[20]

A common denominator observed in definitions with reference to Islam or Muslims is the element of partiality. Such skewed and one-dimensional approach towards extremism makes it prone to faulty analysis and response formulations. In reality, the stakes involved (of extremists of all genres) e.g., esteem, reputation, ambitions, money, power and life plainly defy these assertions. Historical as well as empirical records would reveal that extremism is a deliberate pathway chosen to serve vested ends. It is fixation with position taken in that extremist has a particular perspective to the exclusion of other perspectives or that it strays from the accepted norms and behaviours of mainstream society.[21] That figuratively indicates remoteness in religion, in thought, as well as behaviour.[22] Scholars have argued that people will go to tremendous lengths and expose themselves to all sorts of risks and dangers solely to "prove" that the "myths" they live by are true.[23]

Practically extremism occurs in two forms – intellectual and ideological. In former domain, extremism merely implies taking a carefully thought out position for or against a thought, idea, ideology, policy, political or social movement by locating oneself away and on the far end

compared to ordinary, moderate or popular vision about it.[24] In this shape, it is at best rhetorical and persuasive in character, hence is benign in terms of harm and injury. However, when it is internalised as an entrenched principle, doctrine, ideology, hate or dogma even ego coupled with the desire to physically impose own version on others or supplant competing forces through power projection, i.e., threat or actual use of violence, it is transformed into violent extremism, which is ordinarily recognized as terrorism.

This framework should also clarify that extremism as is generally understood in conceptual terms is differentiated from actions of a violent mob where thousands of isolated individuals may acquire at certain moments, and under the influence of certain violent emotions —such, for example, as a great national event — the characteristics of a psychological crowd.[25] The substitution of the unconscious action of crowds for the conscious activity of individuals is one of the principal characteristics of the mobs, who 'are not to be influenced by reasoning, and can only comprehend rough-and-ready association of ideas'.[26]

It will be relevant to highlight here that many Pakistanis are extremely passionate about Islam and easily roused to anger in its defence. What is note worthy is the fact that in a society where millions are barely literate, raised to revere rather than question, and exposed to limited sources of information, it should not be surprising to see them being easily swept up in mob hysteria against anyone accused of insulting their religion.[27]

Analogously the violence impelled by a spontaneously spurred emotional content - religious, political or social cannot be categorized as religious extremism unless backed by a deliberate notion.

18. Ayesha Siddiqa, 'Red Hot Chilli Peppers Islam – Socio-Political attitudes amongst Youth in Elite Universities in Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi', 2011, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 12, 25, http://www.pk.boell.org/downloads/Red_Hot_Chilli_Peppers_Islam_-_Complete_Study_Report.pdf.
19. For details see Hasan Askari Rizvi, 'Radicalization and Political System of Pakistan', International Conference – De-radicalization and Engagement of Youth in Pakistan, 28-29 July 2008, IPRI (Islamabad Policy Research Institute), 12; M. Zaidi, 'The radicalisation process', February 2011, *the Dawn.Com*; Mandel, D. R., 'Radicalization: What does it mean?' In T. Pick & A. Speckhard & B. Jacuch (Eds*.), Indigenous terrorism: Understanding and addressing the root causes of radicalization among groups with an immigrant heritage in Europe*. Amsterdam Netherlands: IOS Press, 2010.
20. Neumann, (see note 15).
21. For further explanation, see also Terms regarding extremism and terrorism in *Education, Extremism and Terrorism* by Dianne Gereluk, UK:Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, 7.
22. Yousf al-Qaradawi, 'Islamaic Awakening between rejection & extremism', American Trust Publication and The International Institute of Islamic Thought (Issues of Islamic Thought Series No 2), 1.
23. Neil J. Kressel, The mind of the religious extremist, *Global: the international briefing*http://www.global-briefing.org/2012/01/the-mind-of-the-religious-extremist/.
24. Dianne Gereluk.
25. Gustave Le Bon *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1896, http://fellowshipofminds.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/le_bon_gustave_1841_1931_crowd.pdf .
26. Ibid.
27. Pamela Constable, *Playing with Fire*, New York: Random House Publishing Group Inc, 2011, xv.

Extremism – Religion Nexus

Whether or not extremism is inherently rooted in the religion or the proponents of extremism only use religion, is a complex question to deal with. The opinion is divided among analysts, researchers and scholars on this issue.

One school of thought opines that there is no immediately apparent causal linkage between degree of religious practice and violent radicalization [or violent extremism). At best, religion can shape the symbolic content and meaning of a movement, and that religion may bring an individual to believe that a movement is not only just, but also morally and ethically obligatory.[28]

Among such lot however is entrenched a minority of zealots those inflamed by its appeal position themselves beyond norm and do not require any justification as the ideology provides both explanation and justification of whatever is done in its name, which establishes the nexus of religious extremism and political extremism.[29] Degree of religious freedom has been described as the principal reason yielding extremism.

The argument is what cannot be expressed openly in the *absence* of religious freedom, continues to ferment covertly and to take on ever more extreme dimensions. Another position holds that unrestrained religious freedom opens the floodgates to religious extremism which connotes that there is a necessary connection between religious freedom and religious extremism: the one inevitably entails the other.[30] This conception finds its full expression in our context.

However, some leading Islamic scholars call all western definitional strands and views a "reductionism that emphasizes, out of all proportion, the 'pathological' or

'economic' situations", hence "is flawed, deceptive and unhelpful".[31] For them extremism is a product, not of the mainstream historical tradition of Islam, but of modern politics and the modern state that the West itself has produced. [32]

This position is sustained though tenuously by the fact that extremism in world history has not always been religious in origin.[33] The phenomenon has gone through various stages of evolution and transition over the centuries from religious conflagrations in medieval times to the 'national to the global stage - of terrorism in support of left-wing (Marxism) and ethno-nationalism and separatism of 1960's, 70's and 80's (e.g., Irish, Basque and Palestinian, Kashmir).[34] Or recall, for example, the Red Army Faction of the 1970s, the fascism of the 1930s and the wave of anarchist attacks that plagued much of the Western world around the turn of the 20th century.[35] While one horrendous incident of 9/11 alone does not form a new pattern of violence,[36] the current scene of violence in main part definitely stems from religious motivation.

On particular question whether extremism is inherently rooted in the religion or the proponents of extremism only use religion, an informed assessment would tell that all major worldly and divine religions are founded on message of peace, harmony and non-killing. "Zoroastrianism, the religion of ancient Iran, is the oldest non-killing faith," dating back to sometime between the 7th and the 11th century BCE. Jainism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Christianity are also described as non-killing religions. Principles of non-killing are also present in other spiritual traditions such as Confucianism, Taoism, Islam, Judaism, Voodoo, Cheyenne, etc.[37] In Islam peace is a name of God; it is mentioned 136 times in Quran, while the word harb (fighting or war) is mentioned only six times. On the other hand, the word jihad which is currently in wider usage

28. Jonathan Githens-Mazer et el ' Muslim Communities Perspectives on Radicalisation in Leicester', March 2010, The Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalisation Department of Political Science Aarhus University Denmark, http://www.ps.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_statskundskab/subsites/cir/pdf-filer/Rapport4_UK_rev_jgmFINAL.pdf, accessed 29 June 2013.
29. Jean Bethke Elshtain, 'On Religious Freedom and Religious Extremism' Religious freedom project, Berkley Centre for Religion, Peace and World Affairs, http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/rfp/essays/jean-bethke-elshtain-on-religious-freedom-and-religious-extremism.
30.   Ibid.
31. Khurshid Ahmad, 'Terrorism and War against Terrorism: Some Fundamental Issues', *Policy Perspectives* 3, no. 2.
32. GaPervaiz, 'Political Islam and the Media', *Policy Perspectives* 4, no.2.
33. Neil J. Kressel.
34. Thomas Copeland, 'Is the "New Terrorism" Really New? An Analysis of the New Paradigm for Terrorism', *The Journal of Conflict Studies,* winter 2001, Vol. XXI, no. 2 Centre for Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick, 91-105, *www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive/040318/.../OSS2003-01-12.pdf.*
35. Neil J. Kressel.
36. Thomas Copeland*.*
37. Joám Evans Pim, 'Interdisciplinary Perspectives toward a Non-killing Paradigm', Global Non-killing Working Papers #3, 2010, Center for Global Non-killing, 10.

albeit mostly misconstrued and abused, is derived from the Arabic root (Jahada) meaning to strive against an undesirable opponent – an external enemy, Satan, or the base inner self.[38]

The Prophet's (MPUH) agreement with different tribes and non-Muslim communities of Medina mentions Jahada as striving for the collective well-being of the whole community consisting of believers and nonbelievers.[39] Semantically, jahada can not be interpreted as armed struggle, much less holy war without twisting its Quranic meaning. The word appears forty-one times in eighteen chapters (Suras) of the Quran – and not always in the sense of sacred war-while prohibitions against warring occur more than seventy times.[40] In spirit, "Religion has always been the most effective process of developing human character strong enough to forget the motivation of selfishness and to act on the larger concept of duty."[41]

It is true that the strong historical linkages exist between religion and terrorism - in fact, from the first century zealots to the thirteenth century assassins and even up to the nineteenth century, religion offered the only justification for terroristic violence. Terrorism and extremism have not been relegated to one religion, but have spanned a number of religions - from Judaism, Islam, Hinduism and Christianity.[42] However, extremism is not inherently rooted in any of the religions, let alone Islam but its extremisation occurs when individual, group or organisational, geopolitical or realpolitik interests politicise it by way of selective, manipulative or literal employment of religious injunctions beyond contexts to further material objectives. An apt example is application of perverted notion of Jihad to imply only 'Qatal' by Taliban against state and society or 'Takfirism' (excommunication) by sectarian groupings for extermination of ideological opponents.

Similarly, use of religion as a policy instrument by the West led by USA, Arab states and Pakistan during Afghan war, by Pakistan to win favourites inside Afghanistan and attempt to seize Held Kashmir through a protracted armed struggle, and lately by Syria and its adversaries, characterize religion extremism collusion, that in the process produces a range of militant groups imbued with spirit of militant jihad, such as Kashmir.[43]

38. For detailed meaning of jihad and jahada read, Omer Mekki, Emergence of jihadophobia, Kuwait Times 14 Oct 2012, http://news.kuwaittimes.net/2012/10/14/emergence-of-jihadophobia/.
39. Ayesha Jalal, Partisans of Allah : Jihad in South Asia, Lahore: Sang-e-Meel publications 2008, p. 7.
40. Ibid.
41. Ira Chernus, 'President Eisenhower and Dr. King on Peace and Human Nature in Non-killing History: Shaping Policy with Lessons from the Past', (ed) Antony Adolf, Center for Global Non-killing 2010, 153.
42. Dianne Gereluk.
43. Salman Khurshid, 'Indo-Pak Conflict and Possibilities of Peace', *South Asian Journal*, Jan-Mar, 2005, 31-35.

Onset and Pathways of Extremism

Extremist mindset is generated due to prolonged or at times as a result of an instantaneous exposure to a thought process or job description which may be amenable to one's own spiritual, psychological, cultural, religious or political pre-existing mindsets. Violent extremism is also generated in societies where violence is tolerated and glorified. Lionizing Malik Mumtaz Qadri and social vigilantism for example are cases in point.

In other cases, an event of a phenomenal proportion may prove to be a trigger to initiate feelings of sympathy, helplessness, desperation, indignation, vengeance, jubilation etc, depending upon political affinity of individuals, groups or societies with the victims and perpetrators. Apartheid in South Africa, genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia, September 11 destruction of Twin Towers by Arab fanatics, kinetic killing of **Abu Musab al-Zarqaw** in Iraq in June 2006, mysterious death of Osama Bin Laden on 2 May 2011 and burning of Quran by Terry Jones in Florida during 2011, to mention a few. All of these incidences caused psychosocial as well as attitudinal dislocation among multitude of affected citizenry to practically reciprocate in kind or emulate heroism of perceived martyrs.

Major determinants that compose individual, organizational and societal extremism in Pakistan fundamentally derive from ideologue, belief, socio-political narrative and grievance, craving for power, willingness to act violently and organizational support. [44] It is difficult to pinpoint with any precision the pathway an individual follows to become an extremist. Theoretically, structures of varied nature i.e. social, political, cultural and etc. lead to attitude formations which are expressed in behaviours. In addition, there are environmental forces which impact to further refine, alter or shape up the value systems of social beings and networks.

Within structures, principal actors are i) socio-political institutions that include family, tribal or caste kinship, immediate and extended community, politico-religious party, non-state pressure groups, socialization processes;

Figure I - Violence triangle

ii) cultural affiliations, i.e. ethno-national, linguistic, ideological frictions, historical narratives of conflicts, faith based and vigilante movements ; iii) personal charisma or appeal of ideologues, leadership, tribal or family head ;and iv) normative traditions, practices and imperatives such as 'Badal' (revenge), honour killing, prejudice, loyalties etc.

At the community and society level it is the popular discourse that is espoused by the youth without due cognizance of its innate spirit and rationale. For example, a few distinct characteristics of Pakistanis permeate all social spheres without exception. The people have a proclivity for sentimentalism that can be quickly provoked and have a mental set-up that cannot sustain a long and involving rational argument.[45] In part this popular mindset is inspired by a thinking mode that feeds on conceptualization of social issues including religious through binary frames bordering contradictory behaviours.[46]

Secondly, people have a common tendency to use radical rhetoric when discussing other religions, sects, nations, and people.[47] This is not to suggest in any way that average Pakistanis actively embrace or advocate violent extremism. However, they do often relate to, justify, and refuse to unconditionally condemn the ideologies driving violent extremism – even when it directly impacts their lives in the form of suicide bombings or militant attacks.

This accommodation of the extremist mindset creates political space and a favourable environment for radical groups to thrive in.[48] Virtually it is not realized that once a citizenry is cowed, and its decision space transformed, the terrorists' work is done.[49] Besides, especially the youth

44. Muhammad Feyyaz, 'Youth extremism in Pakistan – magnitude, resident spheres, trends and response', draft paper, April 2013.
45. Manzoor Ahmed, 'Pakistan: Aporia of its Kind', in *Pakistan the Contours of State and Society*, (eds) Soofia Mumtaz, Jean-Lucm, Imran Anwar Ali, Karachi: Oxford University Press 2002, 61.
46. Muhammad Feyyaz, 'Youth extremism in Pakistan'.
47. David Hansen, *Radical Rhetoric-Moderate Behavior: Perceptions of Islam, Shari'a, and the Radical Dimension in Urban Pakistan*, Norway: Akademika Publishing May 2012.
48. Wasif Khan, Extremism and mainstream Pakistan, *Dawn.com*, 17 December, 2012.
49. Paul Kamolnick, 'Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and the Rule of Law',*Terrorism and Political Violence*, 23:5, 2011, 820-842.

Figure II - Pathways of Extremism

tend to view the world from a black and white lens demonstrated in a large sampling from 15 leading universities of the country targeting 608 students comprising 228 respondents from Karachi, 168 from Lahore and 132 from Islamabad. [50]

Alongside these peculiarities, there is widespread assumption in international community that social or religious conservatism in Pakistan reflects restrictive thinking, which, in turn, does not bode well for inter-civilization relations.[51] This perception is informed by the fact that the country is replete with "a history of deep-rooted feudal and tribal structures and outmoded cultural traditions; religious intolerance, and a population that is largely illiterate, socially fragmented, and politically and economically dispossessed, and has never had an opportunity to make the necessary transition from a feudal mode of social organization to an industrial mode of functioning". [52]

Within environmental setting are a range of factors such as the political identity or lack of it, national myths and ideologies, perceptions of 'othered', performance and trust in governance system, rule of law and justice system, pluralism, freedom of expression and media, role of religion, conservatism and modernity in society, size of civil society, democratic values, beliefs and practices, secure or insecure borders, type of neighbourhood and penetration of external powers in domestic affairs, etc. In a nutshell, pathway for extremism can be graphically illustrated as shown in Figure II below.

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50. Ayesha Siddiqa, 14, 16,
51. Ibid, 4.
52. Izhar Hunzai, 'A Just and Sustainable Society: A Modern, Progressive and Inclusive Polity in Pakistan in 2030', policy papers, planning commission of Pakistan.

Spectrum of Extremism in Pakistan

In a recent research article by this Writer published in the UK based Journal - *Perspectives on Terrorism*, eight trends of terrorism have been conceptualized and empirically tested *within prevailing environments of Pakistan viz.* human-political syndrome, infrastructural and criminalized warfare, regime and system's change, normative-cultural, ideological-real politik anarchism, spatial conquests, non-seasonal and strategic.[53]

These trends implicitly encompass review of some categories of violence primarily by religious extremists such as Taliban, while the whole variety of extremism having origin in nonreligious sources is much large. A few prominent types of extremism are explained ahead.

Political Extremism

Rhetorical Extremism
Perhaps more than any other, this is the most common phenomenon in Pakistan. It is also labelled by some as political incivility or extremist rhetoric which has far less benign effects on democratic discourse: it demeans opponents, radically narrows understanding of the issue at hand, and closes off compromise.[54]

It is practiced in routine by almost all political actors in the country adopting different symbols, narratives, appeals and styles. Verbal threats include demanding extreme actions by the government such as stepping down from power else face consequences in shape of mass protests, strikes, sit-ins, strikes, shut-down, 'Gherao' (siege) of buildings housing national or provincial leadership etc. Instances involving such rhetoric in post election scenario by certain quarters against media, political workers and State apparatus are plenty.

Similarly, inter-party sparring at times is taken to unbound thresholds. A typical example of it was a statement by MQM (Muttahida Quumi Movement) Chief Altaf Hussain during 2011, threatening to blockade Raiwind besides scathing attacks on the personal lives and family relationships of Nawaz Sharif and Altaf Hussain by their party members in the Parliament.[55]

All said, run up to General Election 2013 epitomized rhetorical extremism to all time high by all mainstream and nationalist parties targeting each other as well as government and its various line agencies, not to mention inciting violence in some cases. A vivid part of it came after the election between Altaf Hussain and Imran Khan on allegation and counter allegations regarding alleged rigging by MQM in Karachi. It reached its climax on May 19, 2013 when the latter accused the former for involvement in killing of a senior politician from PTI. Altaf Hussain rebutted using offensively coarse and lewd language.

Electoral Violence
In view of the contextual nature of electoral violence the form it takes differs from country to country. A recent study by UNDP on understanding electoral violence in Asia, defines the phenomenon as follow:[56]

> *"Any acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process, or that arise in the context of electoral competition. When perpetrated to affect an electoral process, violence may be employed to influence the process of elections — such as efforts to delay, disrupt or derail a poll — or to influence the outcomes: the determination of winners in competitive races for political office, or securing the approval or disapproval of referendum questions".*

According to UN definition the salient characteristic of electoral violence that besides preventing citizens to exercise their right as well as harming candidates and their supporters, include violent acts targeted against objects, buildings and structures such as deliberate destruction of campaign materials, vehicles, offices or ballot boxes etc.[57] Some of it is visible mostly during polling times. A more elaborate definition by the International Foundation for Electoral System envisages electoral violence as any

53. For details see Conceptualizing Terrorism Trend Patterns in Pakistan – an Empirical Perspective, Perspectives on Terrorism Volume 7, Issue 1, February 2013, 73-102.
54. Amy Gutmann, '*The lure & dangers of extremist rhetoric*', Fall 2007 - *Daedalus* (*The Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*), http://www.upenn.edu/president/meet-president/extremist-rhetoric, accessed 22 May 2012.
55. Verbal skullduggery: 'No personal statements', http://www.pkaffairs.com/News_Verbal_skullduggery_No_personal_statements_8422, accessed 22 May 2012.
56. 'Understanding electoral violence in Asia', UNDP 2011, http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/UNDP_elections_violence_AP.pdf, accessed 22 May 2012.
57. Ibid.

spontaneous or organized act by candidates, party supporters, election authorities, voters, or any other actor that occurs during an electoral process, from the date of voter registration to the date of inauguration of a new government, that uses physical harm, intimidation, blackmail, verbal abuse, violent demonstrations, psychological manipulation, or other coercive tactics aimed at exploiting, disrupting, determining, hastening, delaying, reversing, or otherwise influencing an electoral process and its outcome.[58]

Electoral violence can be further divided into two categories - run – up and post election violence and polling day violence.

Run – up and Post Election Extremism
Violence committed in the name of party or leadership is common place in almost all developing countries, without being exception to Pakistan. Loyalty to symbols, images, slogans and leading persons energized by the overly ambition to impose vested political order are the primary constituents to generate extremist positions. It manifests in violently attacking opponents rallies, disrupting their public meetings, manhandling lower echelons of

Figure III- Swathe of Election Violence

ELECTION VIOLENCE

leadership, abductions, torture, targeted killings, indiscriminate firing on party workers, tearing off campaign posters, ransacking election offices, and armed clashes among and between youth wings of competing candidates.[59]

Sit-in as seen in post election scenario in Pakistan organised to protest against alleged rigging and threats of use or actual use of violent methods by corresponding political force to dissuade such gathering is part of extremism of this kind.

Dozens of incidents underscoring these tendencies occurred in different parts of the country during the run up to and post election scenario. It may be noted that the traditional concept is more about constituency-based, candidate- or party-driven violence, voter intimidation, post-election violence triggered by the losing side, etc.[60]

This time around, a unique and empirically somewhat unparalleled feature of violence was the targeting of political left during its election campaign by the terrorists while the right was completely spared ostensibly to reap full advantage of void left by dormant electioneering by the latter. Nevertheless, political activists of certain parties were targeted by their opponents. PTI (Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf) is believed to have suffered the most including murder of Zohra Shahid Hussain, supposedly gunned down by MQM activists in Karachi on 18 May a day before the re-polling was scheduled in parts of a national assembly constituency.[61]

149 incidents of election-related violence were recorded during the campaign period between March 17 and May 9. The violence killed approximately 189 people and injured roughly 667 (see Figure III for spread of violence). Only nine incidents were known to be perpetrated by political party workers or supporters. In two incidents – one in FATA and the other in Punjab, candidates were kidnapped by unidentified perpetrators.[62]

Even though tinged by religious as well as secular considerations, these instances symbolized violent extremism in an election mode at a sustained scale for the

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
58. Megan Reif, Chapter 2 - A Typology of Election-Related Violence: An Event-Based Approach to Political Violence from Precipitating Offenses to Emergent Lethality, University of Michigan, http://sitemaker.umich.edu/comparative.speaker.series/files/typology_of_election_violence.doc.

59. For example see, '4 killed in post-election violence', *Pakistan Today,* 14 May 2013; 'Over 30 dead as Pakistan braves Taliban to vote', Z.com, 11 May 2013.

60. Moeed Yousuf, 'Impact of Violence', *Pakistan Today*, 29 April 2013.

61. See frontline reports by Imran Ayub, 'PTI leader shot dead on eve of re-polling', *Dawn* 19 May 2013 and 'Imran holds Muttahida responsible for murder', *Dawn* 19 May 2013.

62. 'Election Violence during 2013 Campaign Period', *World Tribune Pakistan*, 12 May 2013.

first time in Pakistan.

Election Day Violence

Recent examples of this violence feeding on charged intimidation and coercive methods by opposing parties were witnessed in June 2011 during the Election for AJ&K (Azad Jammu and Kashmir) Legislative Assembly (Figure IV).

The activists from the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) clashed with those from Punjab's ruling Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) resulting in several instances of violence in Lahore that left scores of voters injured and caused the AJK Election Commission to postpone the election for the Kashmiri Diaspora in Lahore (LA-17) and Sheikhupura districts (LA-37).[63]

In General Election of 2008, violence was not widespread compared to the past, however selective intimidation occurred, particularly against journalists and media houses. However, electoral violence was witnessed at large scale on May 11, 2013, day of General Election, in Pakistan. Apart from Taliban inspired violence, country wide incidences were reported of assaults, clashes, intimidation, threats and rigging. Bloodiest occurrences were reported from Chaman, Karachi, Dadu, Lahore, Nawabshah and Rawalpindi where voters, supporters and electoral staff were specifically targeted by armed groups from competing parties. Karachi was the focus of most complaints reported by rival political parties.[64]

Xenophobia in Pakistan

Generally, this facet of extremism is rarely discussed and known to many in Pakistan due to its blending with other forms of hate, mostly in historical sense.

Xenophobic tendencies among Pakistanis especially the school and college going youth derive from multiple sources that create intolerance and suspicion about foreigners in particular westerners. A new report released by the Jinnah Institute in Islamabad reached a very bleak

Figure IV - Activists of a political party tearing up the election office of another political party in Muzaffarabad.

conclusion in this regard, describing the existing educational curriculum of our public education system as one "of hatred", one "which wholly or partially, is biased, selective and inculcates in the child a parochial and subjective outlook."[65]

The prevalent 'us and othered' psychological formation is spurred at an early school-going age. Text books are written to pursue expedient policies and internalise certain notions of 'national interest,' which may come at the expense of imbuing the children with ideologies that promote hate and intolerance.[66] What is being taught as history is really national mythology.[67] The children don't learn History. They are ordered to read a carefully selected collection of falsehoods, fairy tales and plain lies.

By making an in-depth study of 66 textbooks in use in the schools and colleges of the country, a former Pakistani historian K.K. Aziz identified excessive errors of fact, emphasis and interpretation, having ravaging effects on the students and the nation at large.[68]

According to a report compiled by the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), which examined text books for grades one to 12, most text books "[encourage] or [justify] discrimination against women, religious and ethnic minorities and other nations."[69] Young individuals,

63.   Irfan Ghauri and Abdul Manan, 'Election battles: Allegations of rigging spark violent protests', *The Express Tribune*, 27 June 27 2011, http://tribune.com.pk/story/197254/election-battles-allegations-of-rigging-spark-violent-protests/, accessed 22 May 2012.
64.   'Pakistan elections a step forward: EU', *Daily Times,* 14 May 2013
65.   Syed Mohammad Ali, 'Time to address Pakistan's xenophobia', *Express Tribune*, 23 May 2012.
66.   Husham Ahmed, 'Identity crisis haunts Pakistani youth!' *International The Statesmen*, 2 February, 2010, http://www.thestatesmen.net/news/identity-crisis-haunts-pakistani-youth/.
67.   'History taught in Pakistan challenged', *Times of India*, 3 February 1999, http://groups.google.com/group/alt.india.progressive/browse_thread/thread/6c96889e54f23bf4.
68.   'A critique of history textbooks used in Pakistan', *The Business Standard* Text, http://www.hvk.org/1997/0497/0191.html, accessed 1 July 2013.

who get the opportunity to read beyond their text books, are increasingly questioning the biased versions of historical narratives. Others, who are not lucky enough to read widely, have formulated views which are far from the truth.[70] Specifically, Pakistan and Social Studies textbooks are rife with negative comments regarding India and Great Britain, but Hindus are often singled out for particular criticism both textually as well as orally. Hindus are repeatedly described as extremists and eternal enemies of Islam whereas Hindu culture and society are portrayed as unjust and cruel, while Islam is depicted as just and peaceful.[71] It may have been a security need of the past to build certain mindsets, but is no longer tenable by present realities.

Continued persecution of polio vaccinators also expressly exemplifies Xenophobia. In October 2009, Mahnama Banat-e-Aisha, an Urdu-language monthly magazine which is part of the Haftroza Al-Qalam group of publications belonging to the militant group Jaish-e-Muhammad, alleged in a lengthy article that the international polio eradication campaign was a "dangerous Jewish conspiracy."[72] Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan and other groups opposing polio drops claimed that the vaccinations were made out of pig fat and hence forbidden for Muslims; some of these sermons declared any child who got paralysed or died of polio a martyr, for refusing to fall for a western conspiracy.[73]

Role of media is not unblemished in accentuating xenophobic tendencies among commoners. Pakistan Media Watch makes an incisive case study from a few articles published by the daily *Nation*. Particular references are drawn from Kaswar Klasra's article in which he accuses American reporter Matthew Rosenberg of being a spy, to statements that any actions by India must be seen as "a deliberate pattern towards some nefarious goal," to the recent column about Aafia Siddiqui in which Sikander Shaheen accuses the US, India, and Israel of being "in an unholy alliance to tighten the noose around a Muslim lady."[74]

Also interesting enough and historically vindicated, elaborating complex theories involving nefarious actors to explain the day's events has always been a sort of national pastime in Pakistan. The country's calamities are frequently blamed on a "foreign hand" that in the past was virtually synonymous with India but increasingly refers to the United States.[75]

In effect, there seems to be no appetite to tackle ground realities that allow extremism and militancy to flourish in the country. Instead, each new terrorist attack brings a fresh round of reactionary rhetoric blaming 'outside forces' and stirring up increasingly outrageous conspiracy theories.[76]

Religious and Societal Vigilantism

In principle, vigilantism occurs where state abdicates its authority (sometimes willingly) thereby encouraging non-state activism to fill the vacuum by assuming governance functions of the state. It takes multiple forms according to the perception of those who employ it as a justification for their action.

In one form it has been called *vigilante Islamism* - the permissibility of a non-state actor to take unilateral action, through violence if necessary, to enforce the '*Sharia*' apart from the hand of the state.[77] For example, forceful imposition of Sharia in neighbourhood and armed contestation with state by clergy and students of Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa Islamabad during July 2007 was violent extremism in operational sense, and religious vigilantism in terms of intent.[78]

Identically but non-religious in outlook, there are examples of a person or group of people taking the law in their own hands and setting out to punish a criminal or an assumed criminal without meeting legal needs. Known as vigilante

69. Husham Ahmed, 'Unanswered questions', *BlogDawn.com*, 1 February 2010.
70. Ibid, 'Identity crisis haunts Pakistani youth!'
71. Azhar Hussain, Ahmad Salim and Arif Naveed, 'Connecting the dot: Education and Religious Discrimination in Pakistan', U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)November 2011.
72. Tufail Ahmad, 'Pakistan's Jewish Problem', 11 March 2011, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/5090.htm.
73. Sana Saleem, 'Muslim scholars fight to dispel polio vaccination myths in Pakistan', *The Guardian UK*, 4 November 2011 http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2011/nov/04/polio-vaccination-pakistan
74. 'The Nation and Xenophobia', Pakistan Media Watch, 15 February, 2010, http://pakistanmediawatch.com/tag/matthew-rosenberg/
75. Nicolas Brulliard, 'Pakistan: conspiracy theorists have field day with Raymond Davis', *Global post*, 24 *February 2011.*
76. Wasif Khan.
77. Joshua T. White, 'Vigilante Islamism in Pakistan: Religious Party Responses to the Lal Masjid Crisis', *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* vol. 7. 11 November 2008 Hudson Institute, http://www.currenttrends.org/docLib/20081117_CT7final%28lowres%29.pdf.
78. Ibid.

justice, this has been equated with vengeance, and ethically reflects moral decline of the society.[79]

As discussed earlier, while all in a mob participating in an episode of vigilante justice may not have extremist tendencies for violence but the instigators and those who make decision and motivate others to join, are actual vigilantes imbued with propensity and penchant for violence. Among other, brutal two-hour long lynching of two young brothers on August 15, 2010 at Sialkot stands out particularly.[80]

Vigilantism is not confined to social spheres, but has found fringes even among the most disciplined of the nation, the paramilitary and armed forces. The Amnesty International found evidence of frequent torture, used over sustained periods against those in custody. Reportedly but not empirically verified, a parallel policy exists of simply killing suspects and dumping their bodies in the tribal areas. During January 2013, 18 villagers in Khyber agency were killed by paramilitary forces during or shortly after raids on their homes. It provoked an anguished protest in Peshawar by families who brought the corpses of the victims with them.[81] Similar instances were previously reported from Swat during time of military operations.

Along with other human rights organizations, a report from Human Rights Watch (HRW) has alleged that the Pakistani Army carried out 238 extrajudicial killings of people in the Swat Valley from September 2009 until July 2010. The HRW report further details that while police have also been involved in the killings, most of them have been carried out by the Army.[82] The claims have been denied by the Army.

Militarized peace committees, armed 'Lashkars' and militia are another manifestation of vigilantes, who in this case have been encouraged by police and the government to undertake operations against militants especially in parts of FATA and Swat.[83] After remaining dormant for some time, the vigilantes are resurgent against the Taliban, without however much thought on after effects of militarization of

Figure V – Tribal Militias' revival against Taliban

the tribes on society, as potential source of instability in post Taliban scenario (Figure V).[84]

Ransacking market centre, putting shops and houses on fire, and killing of nine loyalists of Taliban's Hanafi group in Hangu on 4 June 2013 by the armed peace committee belonging to slain legislative Fareed Khan who was assassinated by militants, is the latest episode reflecting militaristic potential of vigilantes.[85]

Ethno-Nationalist and Genocide Extremism

Simmering currents of ethno-nationalism have existed in Pakistan throughout its history. Hazara, Sarieki and Sindhi movements and armed Baloch strife are ethno-nationalist struggles aimed at achieving varied objectives ranging from enhanced autonomy to separation. Hazara and Sindhi nationalists have been violent to a limit; Sarieki nationals have by and large adhered to constitutional politics.

MQM which is yet another ethnic movement based in urban centres of Sindh is situated in the middle of violent-nonviolent spectrum. It has fought bitter battles with other ethnic groups residing in Karachi as well as with the state

79. S.Mirza, 'Cause and effect of vigilante justice, ref. The Sialkot lynching tragedy', SAFIRE, 31 August 2010, http://sapphirical.wordpress.com/2010/08/31/cause-and-effect-of-vigilante-justice-ref-the-sialkot-lynching-tragedy/.
80. Ali Usman, 'Sialkot brothers' deaths: Justice Catches up with lynchers', *Express Tribune*, 20 September 2011 and *Jawad Muzaffar,* 'Mourning the Sialkot killings', Dawn blog, http://blog.dawn.com/2010/08/23/nation-mourns-sialkot-sons%E2%80%99-killings/
81. 'The armed forces operate vigilante justice', *The Economist*, 9 February 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21571469-armed-forces-operate-vigilante-justice-rogue.
82. Syed Shoaib Hasan, 'Pakistan army accused of extrajudicial killings in Swat', BBC News Karachi, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10667545.
83. Wesley Oliver, 'Pakistani Vigilantes Strike at Taliban: desperate police encourage citizens to take actions', NEWSER, 2 November 2008, http://www.newser.com/story/41539/pakistani-vigilantes-strike-at-taliban.html,
84. Sikander Shaheen, 'Tribal militias revived in Fata to combat militancy', *The Nation*, 3 June 2013.
85. For detailed news, read Abdul Sami Paracha, 'Violence in Hangu continues; 11 Killed', *Dawn* 5 June 2013.

forces during 1990s. Despite these developments MQM remained part of the ruling coalition in Sindh (with representation in national government) in 1988-89, 1990-1992 and 1997-98. [86]

In addition to widening control of resources of Karachi now bitterly contested by several emerging ethnic, criminal and religious competitors, MQM has also been engaged in fighting and sustaining an intraparty armed conflict between mainstream and its breakaway faction known as MQM-H (Mohajir Qaumi Movement - Haqiqi) throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. The main tactics employed by both groups were small-scale attacks, usually targeting the headquarters or noted members of their enemy. [87] MQM has been involved ever since in the intrastate and non-state categories of organised violence in Karachi, Hyderabad, Sukker and Mirpur. Its multilayered paramilitary wing is known to comprise hardened marksmen, sharp shooters and criminal for initiating large-scale riots and engaging in targeted killing. The latest is killing of Zohra Shahid Hussain reportedly by MQM activists. [88] The Party's extremism draws its inspiration from the dictates of real-politik and ethnic motivation based on pro-poor, anti feudal, antiestablishment, non-elite and progressive rhetoric with charisma residing in the person of Altaf Hussain. In reality the party has been described by critics as a policy-neutral, ideologically agnostic and pro-status quo despite claims to the contrary. [89]

Like Karachi, Balochistan is in high spate of violence since a decade. Without going into history of justifications advanced by Baloch nationalists to initiate armed struggle, a particular feature of ongoing violence is its identification with Baloch youth.

There are about a dozen Baloch resistance groups operating in the province led by younger generation of

traditional tribal elders joined also from lower layers of society viz. Harbiar Marri, Brahamdagh Bugti supported by his brother-in-law Mehran Baloch, Dr. Allah Nazar and Javed Mengal. The main driving force inciting extremism is Brahamdagh, grandson of Nawab Bugti, who in an interview with a private TV channel in Pakistan on 15 April 2009 urged Baloch people to kill any non-Balochi residing in Balochistan, whether civilian or military personnel, to prove themselves as Balochi. [90] He is followed by Allah Nazar, who wields a strong influence in Makrat division. Consequently, the target killing started in 2003, that was initially sectarian in nature gradually encompassed Law Enforcement Agencies and the non-Baloch settlers in its targeting folds. [91] A total of 3700 fatalities have been reported from 2004 until January 2013. [92] Some analysts have noted that what is happening is a "low level ethnic cleansing". [93]

Honour and Cultural Extremism

In some respect cultural violence, that characterizes those aspects of culture that can be used to justify or legitimize the use of direct or structural violence, are partially related to extremist rhetoric. [94] The Stars and Stripes, Hammer and Sickle, flags, hymns, military parades, portraits of the leader, inflammatory speeches, [images, symbols, anthems, war songs, crosses, crescents, slogans, typical dress] and posters are also included in this category."[95]

Honour killing or honour crime is not part of extremism paradigm per se. The practice has traditional and cultural origins[96] due to difference in motivation and codes of morality and behaviour that typify some cultures. [97] Commonly, it is not considered a matter of faith, but more to "do with misguided notions of family honour [than] with radicalism or terrorism. [98] However, researchers have opined that honour killings are often reinforced by

86.   Muhammad Feyyaz, 'Ethnic Conflict in Sindh', PILDAT Background Paper, October 2011.
87.   'MQM-MQM-H, Non-State conflict Pakistan', Uppsala Conflict Data Project,
      http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=122&regionSelect=6-Central_and_Southern_Asia#
88.   See note figure 61.
89.   Mohammad Waseem, 'Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan: The Case of MQM', *The Pakistan Development Review*, 35: 4 Part II (Winter 1996) 617—629.
90.   'Balochistan Liberation Army', Baloch National Media.
91.   Muhammad Feyyaz, 'Constructing Baloch militancy in Pakistan', *South Asian Journal* April-June 2013.
92.   Balochistan Assessment 2013, South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Balochistan/index.html.
93.   Anatol Lieven, *PAKISTAN A Hard Country*, UK: Penguin Books, 2011, 351.
94.   For detailed definition of Cultural violence' see Johan Galtung, Cultural Violence, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 291-305 (1990),
      http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/27/3/291, accessed 19 Mar. 2010.
95.   Muhammad Feyyaz, 'State, military and information warfare nexus: A conceptual perspective of South Asia', *Journal of Information Warfare* 9 (2)
      September 2010, Australia.
96.   Robert Kiener, 'Honour Killings – the issues', Global *Researcher* Vol 5, no.8, (19 April 2011), 188-200.
97.   Phyllis Chesler, 'Worldwide Trends in Honor Killings', *Middle East Quarterly,* spring 2010, 3-11.
98.   Felix Lowe, 'Honour' killings linked to terror groups', *Telegraph*, 26 June 2007.

fundamentalist religious dictates. The findings of a recent study on worldwide emerging trends indicate that honour killings accelerated significantly in a 20-year period between 1989 and 2009. One of the reasons ascribed for this escalation, is identification of honour killings as a function of jihadist extremism and Islamic fundamentalism.[99]

In 2000, the United Nations estimated that there were 5,000 honour killings worldwide every year.[100] According to Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, trends are on the rise in Pakistan; more than 900 women, girls and minor were killed in the name of honour in 2012. In most cases, murderers were brothers and husbands of the victims. Not only the society condone these crimes, many of the killers are set free by courts by invoking the provision of "grave and sudden provocation" which has been omitted from the law.[101]

As a societal norm even though generally but not essentially occurring in tribal and archaic segments of the society, it reflects prevalence of opportunity structures and the rise of extremist attitudes within social institutions.[102] Ironically, in sizeable instances, honour is only a pretext to murder women for property, revenge or to remove women from the scene in order to remove a legal heir.[103] The fact that such a primitive and barbaric crime continues to be committed as a duty across Pakistan suggests that the culture on the ground is not changing despite the outcry of various human rights organizations.

Cultural extremism has manifested also in the bombing of Sufi shrines; destruction of ancient Buddhist shrines as well as video and music shops.[104] The activity mainly stems from 'Talibanisation' drive in the country, but criminal elements have been partaking in these efforts as part of organised crime. In March 2013, the 150-year old Baba Karam Singh temple was demolished overnight by the land mafia in Mardan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.[105]

Inter Faith Extremism

Pakistan is home to 3% religious minorities from all major and minor religions and traditional confessions. The break-up of religious minorities shows that the Hindu community is the largest with 1.4 million followers followed by 1.27 million Christians. Besides, there are 125,681 Ahmadis or Qadiyanis, over 33,000 Baha'is, 6,146 Sikhs and over 4,000 Zoroastrians or Parsees. Meanwhile, no fewer than 1,500 Pakistani citizens have classified themselves as Buddhists.[106]

While an abode of a peace loving religion intertwined with traditions of moderation by Sufis, Pakistan is the third least tolerant country in the world in terms of social acceptance of religious diversity.[107] Attacks against minorities, their worship places and even desecration of their graveyards are on the rise.[108]

Persecution and hate against minorities especially Christians and then Ahmadis is hatched by strong perception of their being allies of western powers, and enemies of Islam. While there is no organized group targeting Christians barring communal uprising triggered by episodic aggravations, campaign against Ahmadis is spearheaded by Sunni hardliners as well as by fanatic sections of general public.

99. Chesler.
100. Ibid.
101. Akhtar Amin, 'HRCP says 'honour killings' on the rise in Pakistan', *the News*, 25 March 2013.
102. 'The unending honour crimes', *Pakistan Today*, 6 April 2013, see more at: http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2013/04/06/comment/editorials/the-unending-honour-crimes/#sthash.lr3HEtSC.dpuf.
103. See Neshay Najam, '*Honour Killing in Pakistan*', http://www.islamawareness.net/HonourKilling/pakistan.html; Immamuddin Khoso et al, '*Problems and Challenges Faced by the Rural Women*', *Asian culture and history, Vol. 3, No. 1; January 2011 at* http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ach/article/view/8921/6566 ; The unending honour crimes, ibid.
104. Besides personal observations, these trends have been based on news items and writings appearing in numerous academic expositions and national dailies. Some can be found in 'Militancy in Pakistan's Borderlands : Implications for the Nation and for Afghan Policy' by Hassan Abbas, A Century Foundation Report, ; Joshua T. White, ibid; Tahir ul Qadri, *Fatwa- Terrorism Fitna- Khawarij*, 1st Edition, January 2010, www.MinhajBooks.com; Afiya Shehrbano, 'Pakistan: Can religious extremism be countered without secular alternatives ?' *Dawn*, 2 February 2009; Afiya Shehrbano Extremism is a thin line, Dawn.com, 2 February 2009.
105. 'State of Human Rights in 2012', Human Rights Commission of Pakistan March 2013, http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/wp-content/pdf/AR2012.pdf.
106. Sabir Shah, 'Minorities, including Christians, at receiving end in Pakistan', *The News*, 15 March 2013.
107. 'Connecting the dot: Education and Religious Discrimination in Pakistan'.
108. For details see 'Life on the Margins,' National Commission for Justice and Peace, 27 March 2012; *Annual Report 2011,Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and the History of blasphemy law, International tribune,* http://tribune.com.pk/story/99414/the-history-of-the-blasphemy-law/, accessed 11 April 2012.

The reactions to assassination of Governor Salman Taseer which shocked many in Pakistan, but not all condemned the murder epitomizes this proclivity.[109] Eight weeks after the assassination of Governor Taseer, the Christian Minister for Minority Affairs Shahbaz Bhatti was murdered probably because of his advocacy against the blasphemy law.[110]

Recent Joseph Colony disaster in Lahore is another example where an unruly mob had set ablaze the houses of the Christians, besides reducing their belongings to mere ashes.[111] During October 2012 at least six churches were attacked in Karachi, two of them within a period of 10 days.[112] On several occasions, police personnel and members of judiciary have condoned the violence perpetrated against the accused in blasphemy. In 2000, acting Chief Justice of Lahore High Court, Justice Mian Nazir Akhtar, succinctly stated that "no one had authority to pardon blasphemy and that anyone accused of blasphemy should be killed on the spot, as a religious obligation."[113] Incidents the like in Shantinagar in 1997, Gojra 2005, Kasur and Sangla Hill 2009 and Lahore 2013 should not be surprising when state functionaries themselves instigate and encourage commoners to take law into their hands.

Compared to Christians, "The Ahmadis are the worst persecuted minority in the country The society by allowing "for the dehumanization of Ahmadis or Christians, is in fact effectively cannibalizing itself."[114] Whether it is about banning a certain juice brand, expelling Ahmadi students from universities or failure to recognise the only Pakistani Nobel Laureate, the hatred fuelled by religious clerics knows no boundaries.[115] They are despised, detested and targeted even with more brutality, including by members of civil society sanctioning against constitutional rights of religious freedom in locales of their residence particularly in slums and squatter settlements. During May 2013, several incidents of violence against Ahmadis have taken place in Lahore alone, with police in complicity with the perpetrators wherein groups of anti-Ahmadi activists transgressed limits of fundamental rights by resorting to violent methods to coarse, harass and intimidate into submission and forsaking their beliefs.[116] Their worship places have been subjected to terrorist attacks and mob rioting quite frequently ever since they were declared non-Muslim during 1974. As of now things for them appear to be growing worse as hatred and intolerance spread;"[117] 20 Ahmadis were killed on account of their religious identity during 2012.[118]

Brain Drain Extremism

The violent extremism has not spared members of civil society either most prominently to include doctors, lawyers and journalists. Since 2001, 30 doctors, 38 lawyers, 43 journalists, parliamentarians, several educationists, and social as well as women's rights activists have been killed by sectarian, anti-Ahmadi, ethno-nationalist, terrorist and anti-social elements.[119]

The growing trend of the intellectual elites leaving Pakistan has reached the threshold where people are not merely leaving on their own accord but forced out of their homeland due to threats to their lives and those of their loved ones.[120] Many, if not most of the children who go abroad for higher studies eventually decide not to come back to Pakistan, adding to the brain drain.[121] FATA presents a typical example where until 2009; more than 600 tribal Maliks had been killed by militants to eliminate leadership

109. 'The flip side of the coin – Sunni Tehreek plans to provide killer legal assistance', *Pakistan Today*, 10 January 2011; 'Sunni Tehreek's protest against Qadri verdict turns violent*, the Express Tribune*, 3 October 2011.
110. See Country Chapters: Countries of Particular Concern (Pakistan), United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) Annual Report 2011 available at http://www.uscirf.gov/images/book%20with%20cover%20for%20web.pdf.
111. Sabir Shah.
112. State of Human Rights in 2012.
113. Tahir Kamran, 'Pakistan's dispossessed Christian community', *South Asian Journal* April-June 2012, 47-72.
114. Zofeen T. Ebrahim, 'Ahmadis: The lightning rod that attracts the most hatred', *Dawn.Com*, 28 October 2011.
115. Fiaza Mirza, 'Social terrorism: religious vendetta against Ahmadis', *Dawn.com*, 17 April 2012.
116. Rana Tanveer, 'Persecution: Anti Ahmadi group targets community again', *the Express Tribune*, 8 May 2013.
117. Zofeen T. Ebrahim.
118. State of Human Rights in 2012.
119. For details about doctors, lawyers and journalists see Pakistan Data Sheets, South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/index.html; also read *Gordon Brown ,* Principal Murdered in Pakistan: Latest Assault on Girls' Schooling, Women in the World, 30 March 2013.
120. 'Pakistan intellectual brain drain', Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/social-issues-current-events/116711-pakistans-intellectual-brain-drain.html#ixzz2TrHqlZef.
121. M.Zaidi, 'Educational Rift', *The Express Tribune*, 9 March 2013.

cadres that count has now surpassed over 1500. [122]

Sect/Intra-sect Extremism

This is the most prevalent classification of extremism that has so far claimed 8682 lives since 1989.[123] In ways sectarianism can also be termed as mother of all forms of terrorism in Pakistan.

Figure VI illustrates the evolution of sectarianism in Pakistan since its creation. It explains how in the period following independence sectarianism gradually increased in intensity and spread from theological to social planes. It is important to point out that for about 35 years, from 1947 until the early 1980s; sectarianism was virtually non-existent in Pakistan.[124]

As religious polarization deepened in Pakistani society, hitherto nonviolent, ideological cleavages among Sunnis kept intensifying to draw adherents (Moqalideen) of major schools of Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh) and Ghair Moqalideen (deviant of any schools) into a violent competition. At present, four intra-sectarian conflict paradigms can be identified within different confessional denominations (Ahle Hadith, Salafis, Deobandis, Wahabis, and Barelvis etc) of the Sunni sect.[125] 2012 saw heightened sectarian violence with at least 507 recorded fatalities in

173 incidents, as against 203 killings in 30 such incidents in 2011.[126] Recent example is running over of the strongholds of Ansaar ul-Islam (Pakistan), an anti-Taliban armed Barelvi group, in Tirah valley in Khyber Agency by combined assaults of its chief rival Lashkar-e-Islam augmented by Taliban.

Principal protagonists engaged in this conflict are ASWJ (Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamat) formerly Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba (ASS) in 1970s and SSP (Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan) in mid 1980s, Ansaar ul-Islam (Pakistan), Lashkar-e-Islam, LeJ (Lashkar-e-Jhangvi), Sunni Tehrik, TNSM (Tehrik Nifaz Shariat-e-Muhammadi), TNFJ (Tehrik—e-Nifaz Fiqah Jaafria), and Sipahe-e-Muhammadi. TTP (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan) and its regional variant TTS (Tehrik-e-Taliban Swat) have supported several attacks by LeJ at home and transnational.[127]

Figure VI - Genesis and Transformation of Sectarianism

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
122. Muhammad Feyyaz, Characterizing armed conflicts in ungoverned spaces - A case of FATA', (unpublished research article), May 2013.
123. 'Sectarian Violence in Pakistan: 1989-2013' (Data till April 21, 2013), South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm.
124. Muhammad Feyyaz, 'Facets of religious violence in Pakistan', *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis*, Volume 5: Issue 02, February 2013.
125. Ibid.
126. 'Pakistan Assessment 2013', South Asia Terrorism portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/index.htm.
127. For details see Conceptualising Terrorism Trend Patterns in Pakistan – an Empirical Perspective.

Conclusion

In all its forms and manifestations, extremism in Pakistan draws its roots from increasing sectarinisation of definition of a Muslim and a citizen, xenophobia, geopolitics, elitism and proneness to violence which reign psychological orientation of the State apparatus and society alike.

This paper argues that since extremism in Pakistan has diverse roots, Federal and Provincial Governments should prepare and adopt integrated and coherent policy regimes to address extremism in a holistic manner. Policy endeavours should be directed towards structures, social institutions, and discourses to effect change which will systemically influence attitudes and regulate behaviours.

However, in order to achieve this, it must be realized that discourse — or the way in which we frame and interpret the world, both as individuals and collectively—has a powerful effect in facilitating extremism and militancy.[128] It is therefore proposed that besides wider socioeconomic uplift, policy interventions should emphasize restoration of indigenous cultural, lingual and religious traditions and practices especially through curriculum revision and folklore in areas plagued by bigotry and hardened attitudes.[129]

Likewise, violence and its symptoms should be dealt with by adopting innovative approaches such as treating violence as an 'infectious epidemic' through applying science and method to 'curing violence' in communities.[130]

Equitable governance in and of itself can prove to be a major cure in conditioning frustrations, disillusionment and deprivation. Within the statecraft, use of force should be the last resort to deal with extremism, and when applied, it should be with a sense of accountability and backed by legal provisions.

Political parties also need to initiate a reform process to educate and inform youth wings by examples of leadership through demonstration of palatable dispositions on key issues and reasoned conduct of politics. A screening process may also be organised within their jurisdictions to identify rogue elements which should be handled with requisite attention and specialised care. The latter will also warrant harnessing experts to retrieve those who are misguided, radical and psychologically deranged. Intra-party election and structured debates on sustained basis is also one such measure to inculcate democratic values among the workers and party activists in the long run.

Furthermore, persuasive, innovative and compelling peace overtures, media campaigns on the scourge of extremism and widespread generation of intellectual writings should become principal contributions by civil society organisations.

Connecting with non traditional structures, i.e., faith-based and non-faith based civil society channels operating at community levels can provide alternative forums to further boost efforts by formal civil society.[131]

128. Nazya Fiaz, 'Policy Intervention in FATA: Why Discourse Matters', *Journal of Strategic Security*, Vol 5, No 1 *Spring 2012* Article 8.
129. Ibid.
130. For details see, Lauren Hershey, Sunday Standpoint: Can Violence be Cured? , PCDN, http://www.internationalpeaceandconflict.org/profiles/blogs/sunday-standpoint-can-violence-be-cured?xg_source=activity#.UfD2L9JBOou.
131. Dr. Hedieh Mirahmadi, Mehreen Farooq and Waleed Ziad, Pakistan's Civil Society: Alternative Channels to Countering Violent Extremism First Edition: October 2012 World Organization for Resource Development and Education.

Following a conflict transformation approach, civil society can thus create space for building indigenous "cultures of peace," taking a bottom-up peace-building approach, as opposed to a top-down force alone strategy that provides only short-term peace.[132]

All said and done, the prevailing situation calls for collective efforts by all the stakeholders in their respective spheres to rid the society of the menace of extremism and its multiform representations.

132. Nazya.

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